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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GROWTH OF MATHEMATICS AND
ECONOMICS IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES
Abstract
This paper examines the relations between the growth of mathe-
matics and economics during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
We identify several factors that may have contributed to the retarda-
tion in the growth of mathematical economics before the twentieth
century. Although several authors have studied the development of
mathematical economics, to our knowledge no one has focussed on the
parallel development of mathematics and economics and the interplay
between these subjects. Our basic thesis is that many mathematical
concepts indispensable to modern mathematical economics were unavail-
able to economists before the twentieth century, either because they
were yet to be developed or because many of the founding figures of
Political Economy were inadequately trained in mathematics.

I. INTRODUCTION
Students of the history of economic thought will generally agree
that even though there is ample evidence of the use of mathematics in
economics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the mathemati-
zation of economic theory is largely a twentieth century development.
Such topics in mathematical economics as dynamic analysis, game
theory, optimization techniques (e.g., linear and non-linear program-
ming), axiomatic techniques in general equilibrium analysis, models of
uncertainty, and especially econometrics—all of which are today con-
sidered an important part of every practicing economists' toolkit
—
were mostly developed in the present century. Why did the raathemati-
zation of economics take so long? Is it because appropriate mathe-
matical tools were unavailable to eighteenth and nineteenth century
economists? Or is it because earlier economists were poorly trained
in mathematics? Perhaps the answer lies in the intellectual climate
of the times when such efforts were discouraged by the important
members of the profession. This paper attempts to pursue some of
these issues. We propose and investigate several hypotheses because
no single factor seems to be entirely responsible for this develop-
ment, or rather, non-development.
The adoption of mathematical methods in economics within a rela-
tively short space of time by Leon Walras, Vilfredo Pareto, F. Y.
Edgeworth and Irving Fisher suggest the conjecture that perhaps the
"time was ripe" in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
While there may be some truth in such an explanation it can too easily
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become a form of evasion, as is perceptively noted by Lubos Novy while
commenting on simultaneous discoveries in mathematics
The fact that those discoveries took place at the same time
cannot be explained by the vague cliche that the time was
ripe, because one then has difficulty explaining the lack of
understanding for these results shown by other mathematicians
of the time. (Novy, 2)
The example of mathematics is most pertinent because social and polit-
ical influences are generally expected to have minimal influence on
mathematicians. However the general philosophical milieu or
Weltanschaung does influence our notions of what are permissible
solutions to any given problem. Unless our account is to recount a
steady stream of progress, it is important to note that even in mathe-
matics "sometimes two (or even more) different concepts and explana-
tions existed, among which it was very hard to decide, in spite of
their incompatibility" (op. cit .
, 5). It is not unreasonable to con-
jecture that philosophical presuppositions determine the particular
course taken in the presence of such uncertainties. While our gen-
eral examples are taken from various European sources, attempts to
link up mathematical economics with the intellectual "spirit of the
age" will be made only for Britain. Section II deals with four
reasons for the early discouragement of mathematical economics: the
early missteps; the negative reception of early attempts; the lack of
mathematical competence and conceptual clarity among economists; and
finally, the lack of suitably developed mathematics. Section III pre-
sents our conclusions.
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II. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
II. A. The Role Played by the Initial Missteps
One factor that may have played a role in retarding the appli-
cation of mathematics to economics is the discouragement caused by
several failed initial attempts in this direction. A "false begin-
ning" especially when committed by the important members in a field
may very well stunt the future growth of the field. A notable case
of a false beginning for mathematical economics is that of Francis
Hutcheson, who taught Adam Smith, and is believed to have greatly in-
fluenced Smith's early interest in economics. Hutcheson in 1720 pub-
lished An Inquiry into the Original Ideal of Beauty and Virtue
,
in
which he attempted to assess the morality of human actions by using
mathematical expressions and axioms. He gave a set of axioms to
define rationality. These include (1) the extent of desire for a good
depends upon the amount of utility to be realized from the object (2)
when the amount of 'good' from an object equals the amount of 'evil'
all desire or aversion ends. To this sensible attempt to incorporate
the language of mathematics in economics, Hutcheson added his early
attempts to reduce ethics to moral Newtonianism.
The moment of evil, produduced by any agent is, as the prod-
uct of his Hatred into his ability or u = H x A. (Scott,
31-32)
This decision to copy Newton as closely as possible led to an amusing
parody by Laurence Sterne:
Hutcheson, in his philosophic treatise on beauty, harmony and
order, plus's and minus's you to heaven or hell, by algebraic
equations—so that none but an expert mathematician can ever
be able to settle his accounts with S. Peter—and perhaps S.
Matthew, who had been an officer in the customs, must be
called in to audit them. (quoted by Scott, loc. cit.)
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In the fourth edition Hutcheson removed these premature attempts at
quantification.
A second noteworthy example of the use of mathematics being
strongly criticized by fellow members of the profession is the case
of Canard, a controversial figure in the history of mathematical
economics. In order to oppose the physiocratic view that all taxes
fall on land, Canard, who was not an economist by training, committed
himself to analyzing the origins of the wealth of nations. Canard's
work was recognized by the prestigious French Academy, Institut
National des Sciences et Arts . However, Canard and his work in mathe-
matical economics were relentlessly attacked by many well-known
professional economists. In a review of Canard's book published in
the influential Edinburgh Review
,
Francis Horner wrote:
(Canard) has only translated into a foreign language less
readily understood, truths of which the ordinary enunciation
is intelligible and familiar to all. We will not deny that
some branches of political economy, especially those which
relate to circulation, money and the analysis of price, admit
of being treated with a precision which almost approaches
matheraatic exactness. But a subject may possess this preci-
sion without requiring or even admitting the symbolic repre-
sentation of Algebra. (Horner, 56)
Among those critical of Canard and his techniques were such illus-
2trious names as J. B. Say, Cournot, Walras, and Schurapeter. This
unfortunate incident may have damaged the cause of mathematization of
economics by earning mathematical techniques the animosity of many
prominent economists. Not only did Canard's specific use of mathe-
matics come under criticism, but the entire approach of applying
mathematics to deal with topics in political economy was attacked.
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Perhaps we are overplaying this point. However, the history of
various sciences shows that incidents like these involving contro-
versies over irrelevant issues can have significant and lasting
impact. Consider a famous example from mathematics—the unfortunate
debate regarding prior invention of tge calculus between Newton and
Leibnitz. This incident appears to have so poisoned the intellectual
atmosphere of the time between England, Newton's country, and the rest
of Europe, that for a long period, mathematicians in England ignored
most of the developments in mathematics in the continent, causing
English mathematics to fall behind considerably.
These early missteps may well have slowed down the adoption of
mathematics till the early nineteenth century but the moderate and
prestigious defense provided by William Whewell in 1829 should have
indicated the constructive role mathematics had to play. Whewell
begins by noting the paradigm of physics.
We can easily imagine what would have been the result if men
had, without the aid of consistent mathematical calculation,
attempted to make a system of mechanical philosophy. There
would have been three errors difficult to avoid. They might
have assumed their principles wrongly; they might have
reasoned falsely from them in consequence of the complexity
of the problem; or they might have neglected the disturbing
causes which interfered with the effect of the principal
forces. (Whewell, 5)
It was the mathematical formulation of physics that permitted one to
avoid such avoidable errors.
And the making mechanics into a Mathematical science supplied
a remedy for all these defects. It made it necessary to
state distinctly the assumptions, and these thus were open to
a thorough examination; it made the reasonings almost infal-
lible; and it gave results which could be compared with
practice so as to shew whether the problem was approximately
solved or not. It appears I think that the sciences of
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Mechanics and Political Economy are so far analogous, that
something of the same advantage may be looked for from the
application of mathematics in the case of Political Economy.
(Whewell, 6)
Why were these sensible arguments not eagerly seized upon by econo-
mists?
II. B. The Negative Influence of the Prevailing
Intellectual Climate
One of the factors that may have contributed to the retardation in
the mathematization of economics before this century was the negative
response given to initial attempts in this direction. There has
always been a vocal group in the ranks of the profession itself that
has resisted the use of mathematical tools in economic analysis.
There is some evidence to suggest that, prior to the twentieth
century, this group was both influential and effective in its opposi-
tion. The reasons for the opposition are many and diverse. J. B.
Say, an influential French economist, strongly opposed the use of mathe-
matical and statistical tools in economics. In his Traite d* Economie
3
Politique (1803) he stated:
Political economy is like mathematics in that they are both
based on abstraction. However, the important difference is
that in mathematics one deals in magnitudes, while in
political economy one deals in values which are dependent on
the action of faculties, needs and will of man and so belong
to the domain of morals. Consequently, it is superfluous to
apply the formulae of Algebra to variables in Political
Economy because none of these variables are susceptible to
rigorous evaluation. (Say, Introduction)
On a different occasion he returned to the subject:
All attempts to reduce political economy to mathematical
calculations (had been) misleading, for the simple reason
that this discipline called upon human will, human needs and
faculties, which did not provide sufficiently precise data to
constitute the basis of calculation. (Menard, 528)
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Most of these early objections appear to be based on the notion that
applying mathematics in economics is tantamount to quantifying the
moral elements of social life. Consider the arguments of G. B.
Venturi, an eighteenth century writer belonging to the Milanese
4
School, who made relatively extensive use of mathematics in his own
economic analysis but issued the following warning to fellow members
of the profession:
We hope that these reflections will serve as a shining
example to everyone of the danger one runs when one wants to
use mathematics in fields outside the realm of nature and one
wants to express with lines and analytical symbols moral
quantities which depend on a thousand factors and which are
not at all susceptible of any exact measurement.
(Theocharis, 34)
Attempts to meausre preferences per se are not in vogue today—at best
we study the influence of revealed preferences, i.e., choices—and it
would perhaps have been wise of the early mathematical economists if
they had simply moved their attention to the subject of production
where measurement is feasible. Some of the early successful applica-
tions of mathematics arose in fields where the question of measurement
was relatively unprobleraatic, such as the Quantity Theory of Money or
in applications to insurance. It may be no accident that the first
acceptable use of algebraic formulae in economics, e.g., to deduce
marginal productivity, was made by the Prussian Junker, von Thunen, to
the tangible issue of agricultural production and marketing.
Thus, early attempts by a few authors in the nineteenth century to
use mathematical analysis in economics were unsuccessful because their
views and methodology were in discord with those of the dominant
school of the day. This was true in France, Germany and in England.
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Cournot was passed over in France, Gossen in Germany and the Whewell
group in England. In Professor Seligman's words,
The edifice erected by Ricardo, and elaborated by McCulloch
and Mil, became so solid and so stable that it could not be
shaken by any current or gust of criticism or opposition. . .
. Discouraged by their reception, most of these writers
turned to other lines of activity. (Seligman, 534-535)
II. C. Mathematical Training or Lack Thereof of
Earlier Economists
One important reason for the inability to incorporate mathematics
successfully was a lack of clarity in the basic concepts most fre-
quently used—demand and supply. How were these to measured? What
did the phrase "an increase in demand" mean? John Stuart Mill is
commonly believed to have introduced some clarity into this subject
but the following complaint from J. T. Graves, a Law Professor compe-
tent in mathematics, to Whewell shows that the explicit mathematical
formulation led to a puzzle because of a failure to be clear about the
independent variable.
J. S. Mill (Principles , vol. i, p. 528) seems to think
that he does much by making Demand and Supply respectively
Functions of the Price.— (I am translating his explanation
into symbolical language)—so that
D = <j)(P) and S = t|>(P)
and by supposing P to be determined implicitly by the equation
4>(P) = ^(P),
the market price being that which makes demand and supply
equal.
Of <}>(P) we are told that it is a function which in-
creases as P diminishes, while ^(P) increases with P.
This is certainly not at all what is meant in common
acceptation, however vague, by Supply and Demand, which are
not regarded as quantities varying during the "haggling of
the market," but as elements, fixed for a time
,
which
determine the result of that haggling.
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The most important contributors to twentieth century mathematical
economics—Paul Samuelson, Jan Tinbergen, Wassily Leontief, Tj ailing
Koopman, George Dantzig, Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu, and many of the
founding members of the Econometric Society—were all formally trained
in mathematics and in some cases even in physics. Could it be that
one factor behind the retarded progress of mathe-matization of
economics was the inadequate mathematical training of the early
leaders in economics or perhaps an unwillingness to use whatever
mathematics they knew? This was certainly true for the founders of
the Classical school—Adam Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Marx, and J. S.
Mill. There is very little mathematics to be found in The Wealth of
Nations . Although Smith had some mathematical training, there is no
reason to believe that he was sufficiently well-versed in mathematics
to attempt applications to economics. Similarly, Ricardo—a stock
broker by profession—lacked a good background in mathematics.
O'Brien comments on Ricardo, the theoretical economist: "As a pure
theorist his lack of mathematical training occasionally led him
astray" (O'Brien, 270). Indeed, Whewell used Ricardo' s inability to
see the boundedness of certain series of numbers as a demonstration of
the utility of applying mathematics. Ricardo' s friend and fellow
economist, Malthus, also lacked confidence in his mathematical skills
despite the fact that he was the second wrangler at Cambridge, and
despite the rhetorical effectiveness of the arithmetic and geometric
series in his early essay on population. In 1829 when Malthus
received the first paper on mathematical economics written by Whewell,
he wrote back, "I have looked it over with great interest; but I am
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ashamed to say that, never having been very familiar with the present
algebraic notation, and for a great many years having been quite
unaccustomed to using it, I cannot follow you as 1 could wish. . . .
The writings of Marx contained numerical illustrations and formulae
but little to indicate a facility with higher mathematics.
We also find that the eighteenth and nineteenth century writers
who successfully used mathematics as an analytical tool in their
economic writings—Bernoulli, the French Engineers, Canard, Cournot,
Walras, Wicksell, Marshall, Pareto, Edgeworth, and Fisher to name the
Q
most prominent—were all trained as mathematicians. The twentieth
century tradition of teaching advanced mathematics to scores of our
graduate students in economics must have been an important catalyst in
the revolutionary growth in mathematical economics in this century.
To conclude this point, we find support for the thesis that imprecise
economic concepts combined with the lack of mathematical training on
the part of the leaders of political economy was an important discour-
aging factor in the mathematization of economics during the early
years.
II. D. The Underdevelopment of Mathematics
A fourth factor worth investigating is the relative "underdevelop-
ment of mathematics" itself before the twentieth century. We suggest
that one reason the progress of mathematical economics was retarded
was the unavailability of the tools that are most useful to this
field. For a social science such as economics to gain from mathe-
matics, it is not only the overall of sophistication of mathematics
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that is relevant, but it is also important that specific tools which
are useful to economics—dynamic analysis, the notion of functions,
and advanced calculus—be available to be borrowed and applied.
Mathematical economists will generally agree that the most impor-
tant developments in this area include multivariate calculus, mathe-
matical programming and its extensions such as control theory, convex
methods, game theory, and finally the use of modern statistical
analysis to test various economic hypotheses (econometrics). Almost
all these concepts were unavailable to economists before the twentieth
century.
Consider the functional form, which is perhaps the most basic
mathematical concept in modern economics. Since economics is mostly
about relationships among variables, being able to express these
relationships in the functional form of f(x) has helped immensely in
the clarifying of the language of economics and in the furthering of
analysis. However, the use of the functional form is relatively
recent. Though it will come as a surprise to most students of
economics, the earlier quoted critique of J. S. Mill's formulation
shows that it took the profession a long time to clarify elementary
concepts involving variables, such as the notion of demand and supply
as a relationship between independent prices and dependent quantities.
Although eighteenth and early nineteenth century economists frequently
referred to "vent," "demand" and supply, there is little evidence to
suggest that the functional relationships of demand and supply were
understood in the modern sense. It was much later that these concepts
9
were clarified and rigorously defined in economics.
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Why did mathematics not come to the rescue when economics was
struggling to deal with these basic concepts involving relationships
between variables? Perhaps we should first determine if the mathe-
maticians themselves were clear about the functional form and had
developed appropriate symbols to deal with such relationships. In his
elegant series of lectures on great moments in mathematics, Howard
Eves states that the modern concept of functions and the elaborate
branch of mathematics known as "function theory" is almost completely
a twentieth century development. (Eves, 153-55) The word "function"
was first coined by Leibnitz in 1694 to denote any quantity connected
with a curve such as the slope of the curve. Later the concept was
refined in the hands of Bernoulli (1718) and Euler (1707-1783). The
notation f(x) entered mathematics in about 1734 with A. C. Clairraont
and Leonhard Euler. In 1837, L. Dirichlet arrived at the present
definition, which stresses the basic idea of a relationship between
two sets of numbers. Modern set theory, a twentieth century develop-
ment, has revolutionized the concept of functions. Today, a func-
tional relationship is nothing but a special kind of subset of the
Cartesian product set A. x B. According to another perceptive author,
Salomon Bochner, functions are a distinguishing attribute of modern
mathematics, perhaps the most profoundly distinguishing of all.
(Bochner, 257) He goes on to say that in its innermost structure
Greek mathematics was a mathematics entirely without functions and
without any orientation towards functions.
It may be mentioned here that both Whewell and Cournot, accom-
plished mathematicians who made substantial contributions to
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mathematical economics in the nineteenth century, had tried to provide
a general equilibrium framework but found that the mathematics avail-
able to them to be insufficiently developed to permit the formulation
of a general equilibrium model.
Not only were many of the appropriate mathematical concepts lack-
ing between 1700-1850, it is also true that some available concepts,
such as the calculus, were considered highly questionable. The
invention of the calculus faced mathematicians with a considerable
dilemma. The power of the new tool was undeniable, but it was not at
all clear how the foundations of the subject were to be made rigorous.
Bishop Berkeley poked fun at the most popular way of setting up the
derivative through infinitely small quantities or infinitesimals by
calling them the "ghosts of departed quantities." It was not until
the early nineteenth century, with the works of Cauchy and of
Weirstrass that the calculus was finally set up on a firm footing.
The readiness of mathematicians to use the calculus despite widespread
unease about its foundations simply because it was so convenient and
powerful has led Judith Grabiner to ask "Is Mathematical Truth
Time-Dependent?" (Grabiner, 1981) Since several economists of this
period did have training in geometry, with the high Greek standards of
rigor, it is possible that they would have been turned off by the
perplexing lack of rigor of seventeenth century mathematics.
The dominance of the English over continental economics until the
very end of the nineteenth century is unfortunate because the English
universities were not only dominated by a non-mathematical philosophy-
-the cult of the gentleman—some of the mathematics that was produced
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was purely formal and lacking in any mathematical insight. Heaviside,
for example, produced a formal calculus of operators which ignored
problems posed by divergent series and focussed solely on the manipu-
lation of symbols. A. F. Monna comments appropriately that "It is a
symbolic method without giving insight in what is going on." (Monna,
1973, 84)
The axiomatic method is not new. According to some mathemati-
cians, the most outstanding contribution of ancient Greeks was their
organization of mathematics by the axiomatic method. However, the
Greek axiomatic method was subjected to general neglect until the
nineteenth century, when the work of a number of mathematicians
gradually sharpened and refined it. The Grundlagen der Geometrie
written by Hilbert in 1899 played a significant role in revamping the
ancient Greek axioraatics from material axioms to the formal axioms
which are used by mathematicians and economists today. Irving Fisher
was later to make a pointed remark about the difference between using
mathematical methods and acquiring the mathematical spirit. The
axiomatic method is perhaps the most determined driving force in
urging the acquisition of the mathematical spirit. Whewell presented
six "axioms" in his presentation of Ricardo's model, however three of
his axioms can be deduced from the other assumptions and a fourth is
redundant. (Rashid, 1977, 384) Once again we see an important
mathematical tool available to the economic theorist today was not
available before the twentieth century.
-15-
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mathematical concepts and symbols important to economics were unavail-
able to the earlier economists grappling with inherently mathematical
notions in economic theory. While each of the above points has been
presented as an independent unit, it will have occurred to the reader
that such a division is purely one of convenience. For example, if
the early economists had been more mathematically knowledgeable they
could have distinguished between ordinal and cardinal variables and
obviated much needless debate about measurement; similarly, if matrix
algebra had been available in the late eighteenth century, a discern-
ing Physiocrat may have put Quesnay's Tableau in modern input-output
form. The relationship between the growth of economics and mathe-
matics is best indicated by that over-used word, "dialectical."
The major stumbling block which frustrated earlier economists was
multivariate functional relationships. They were frequently unable to
deal with functions with two or more independent variables. The
solution of most economic problems involving a single variable can be
as satisfactorily obtained with diagrams as with algebra. To attack
more significant problems requires mathematics involving several
variables; both Whewell and Cournot were unable to make any progress
on general equilibrium issues because of the lack of linear algebra or
multivariate calculus. The common criticism that economic questions
depended upon a multitude of factors could at least have been satis-
factorily met in such formulations. Why did they not arise?
If any one feature is to be singled out as having slowed down the
formation of mathematical economics it is probably the persistence of
certain philosophical presuppositions of English university thought.
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The refusal to view other disciplines as instrumental, without need of
philosophical guidance, was repugnant and we have seen how repeatedly
it led to negative remarks on the use of mathematics in economics. It
is surprising, but nonetheless true, that a similar ontological status
granted to Euclidean geometry appears to have hindered the growth of
linear algebra. In his early papers Cayley wrote apologetically
about n-diraensional space—how could one conceive of more than three
dimensions? How far the rise of non-Euclidean geometry freed the
general milieu from such philosophical constraints is a topic worth
further study.
The fact that economics was rapidly matheraatized in the twentieth
century suggests the great usefulness of mathematics to many areas in
economics. This need for mathematical tools was recognized early on.
However, this recognition was a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for the widespread use of mathematics in economics. The
lack of the "sufficient conditions precluded a more accelerated
development of mathematical economics prior to the twentieth century.
-18-
NOTES
The list of scholars who have explored the history of mathematical
economics includes Schumpeter (1954), Robertson (1949), Theocharis
(1983), and Henderson (1985). Schumpeter and Robertson conclude that
no school of mathematical economics existed prior to the twentieth
century although there are isolated contributions—many of extra-
ordinary quality. Theocharis identifies several schools, but except
for Cournot, the mathematics employed was relatively rudimentary.
Henderson identifies the Whewell group that existed in Cambridge dur-
ing the first half of the nineteenth century. Once again their in-
fluence on the general direction of the field was minor and the level
of mathematics used low, by today's standards.
2
We do not intend to imply any judgment on Canard, who has been
recently defended by Larson (1989), but rather to focus on the
reception of Canard by contemporaries.
3
Menard (1980) argues that the three most important French econo-
mists of the nineteenth century—Say, Cournot, and Walras—all opposed
the use of statistical methods in economics for one reason or another.
Say spoke against the use of mathematics and formulae in eco-
nomics because they are "most evidently inapplicable to Political
economy and form the most dangerous of abstractions." His opposition
to statistics can be understood from the following passage he wrote:
"when 1 see that there has been no detestable undertaking that has not
been supported and determined by arithmetical calculations, 1 am lead
to believe that it is figures which are the downfall of the sate."
(Menard, 527).
4
Theocharis uses the terra 'Milanese School' to refer to the group
of eighteenth and nineteenth century economists centered in Milan, who
used mathematics in their economic writings. Venturi was a Professor
of Mathematics and Philosophy at the University of Modena.
Whewell papers, Trinity College, Cambridge, J. Graves to Whewell,
January 9, 1849. We are grateful to the keepers of the Whewell Papers
for use of this material.
Quoted in Henderson, p. 426.
Professor Baumol has informed us that Marx produced mathematical
notebooks said to contain lagrange multipliers. However, these are
yet to be published by Moscow where they are being edited. Zauberman
(1975) also informs us that Marx, according to a Russian translation
of his work, had written that a social science is elevated to the
status of a science only when it becomes susceptible to mathematics.
Q
See Blaug, p. 311 and Schumpeter, p. 956.
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9
According to Blaug, Cournot was the first writer to define and
draw a demand function in 1938. See Blaug, p. 333. Also, for a long
time there was a confusion about the dependent variable in the demand
function.
Cournot had concluded that "for a complete and rigorous solution
of the problems relative to some parts of the economy system, it [is]
indispensable to take the entire system into consideration." See
Cournot (1838), p. 127. For Whewell see Rashid (1977).
Marshall is only the most well-known of mathematically competent
economists, who opted not to explicitly employ mathematical techniques
in their economic analysis. Others in this group include, Sidgwick,
Ingram, and Lexis. These economists, for various reasons, were
hostile to the use of mathematics in economics. Marshall's opposition
to the explicit use of mathematical language is legend. He wrote in a
letter to A. L. Bowley in 1906:
I had a growing feeling in the later years of my work at the
subject that a good mathematical theorem dealing with
economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be good economics:
and I went more and more on the rules— (1) Use mathematics as
a shorthand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry.
(2) Keep to them until you are done. (3) Translate into
English. (4) Then illustrate by examples what are important
in real life. (5) Burn the mathematics. (6) If you can't
succeed in (4), burn (3). This last I did often. (Pigou,
427).
12
See the fascinating remarks by Joan Richards in Davis and Hirsh
(1986), 203-217, as well as Richards (1988).
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